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Abstract
This paper investigates the role of policy in money search models with divisible money.
Recently, real indeterminacy of stationary equilibria has been found in both speciﬁc and general
search models with divisible money. Thus if we assume the divisibility of money, it would be
quite diﬃcult to make accurate predictions of the eﬀects of simple monetary policies. Instead, we
show that some tax-subsidy schemes select a determinate eﬃcient equilibrium. In other words,
for a given eﬃcient equilibrium and for any real number δ>0, a certain tax-subsidy scheme
induces a locally determinate equilibrium within the δ-neighborhood of the given equilibrium.
Moreover, the size of the tax-subsidy can be arbitrarily small.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the roles of tax-subsidy schemes in money search models. In most
of cases, money is indivisible and the stationary equilibria are determinate. Thus the
eﬀects of the policies are determinate as well. However, real indeterminacy of stationary
equilibria has been recently found in both speciﬁc and general search models with
divisible money. (See, for example, Green and Zhou [3] [4], Kamiya and Shimizu [6],
Matsui and Shimizu [7], and Zhou [9].) In other words, if we assume the divisibility of
money in these models, the stationary equilibria become indeterminate. Thus it is quite
diﬃcult to make accurate predictions of the eﬀects of simple monetary policies in such
models. Instead, we show that some tax-subsidy schemes select a determinate eﬃcient
equilibrium. In other words, for a given eﬃcient equilibrium and for any real number
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1δ>0, a certain tax-subsidy scheme induces a locally determinate equilibrium within
the δ-neighborhood of the given equilibrium. Moreover, the size of the tax-subsidy can
be arbitrarily small.
In order to explain the indeterminacy of equilibria, we ﬁrst consider a random match-
ing model with divisible money and without intervention of government. There is a
continuum of private agents who meets pairwise according to a random matching pro-
cess. In each meeting, there is no double coincidence of wants, and therefore ﬁat money
can be used as a medium of exchange. In such a model, the conditions for a stationary
equilibrium are (i) each agent maximizes the expected value of utility-streams, i.e., the
Bellman equation is satisﬁed, and (ii) the money holdings distribution of the economy
is stationary, i.e., time-invariant.
In some special models with divisible money, Green and Zhou [3], Matsui and
Shimizu [7], and Zhou [9] found indeterminacy of stationary equilibria by calculating
explicit solutions. Kamiya and Shimizu [6] found the underlying logic of indeterminacy;
namely, there is at least one-degree of freedom in the condition for the stationarity of
money holdings distributions.
To be more precise, we focus on a stationary equilibrium in which all transac-
tions are made with integer multiples of some p>0 and money holdings distribu-
tions have a support expressed by {0,p,2p,...,Np} for some positive integer N. Let
h =( h0,h 1,...,h N) be a probability distribution on the support, where hn is a mea-
sure of agent with money holding np. Suppose the values of the other variables, besides
h, are given. Note that these variables are determined by the Bellman equations for a
given h; namely, the number of these variables are equal to the number of equations in
the Bellman equations. Let In, a function of h, be a measure of agents whose money
holdings are not np before trades and become np after trades, and On, a function of h,
be a measure of agents whose money holdings are np before trades and become n p for
some n   = n after trades. In other words, In is the measure of agents in the inﬂow at
np, and On is the measure of agents in the outﬂow at np. The stationary condition is





n=0 On = 0 always holds, i.e., this is an identity, since each
agent, who belongs to an outﬂow at some n, should belong to an inﬂow at some n  and
thus the total measure of agents in all inﬂows, expressed by
 N
n=0 In, is equal to that
in all outﬂows, expressed by
 N





always holds, i.e., this is also an identity. To see this, suppose that two agents, say
2a buyer and a seller, meet and a monetary trade occurs. Then the amount of money
the buyer pays is equal to that of the seller obtains; in other words, the sum of their
money holdings before trade is equal to that of after trade. Since this holds in each
trade, the total amount of money before trades, expressed by
 N
n=0 pnOn, is equal to
the total amount of money after trades, expressed by
 N













n=0 nOn = 0; i.e., the
number of linearly independent equations among them is N − 1. On the other hand,
 N
n=0 hn − 1 = 0 is the other restriction and the number of variables, h0,h 1,...,h N,
is N + 1. Therefore there is at least one degree of freedom in the determination of
stationary distribution. This leads to the real indeterminacy of stationary equilibria in
random matching models with divisible money satisfying some regularity conditions.
For the details, see Kamiya and Shimizu [6].
Now we introduce a policy into this economy. More precisely, following Aiyagari et
al. [1], we introduce government agents who are similar to private agents in terms of
pairwise matching. According to the rule called a tax-subsidy scheme which is enforced
by the government, they collect tax from or give subsidy to matched private agents. If
the total amount of tax is more than that of subsidy, the monetary authority absorbs
the surplus, while if the total amount of tax is less than that of subsidy, the authority
issues the necessary amount. Thus the total amount of money the private agents have





n=0 nOn = 0 does not always hold. Thus the total
number of equations is equal to that of variables and the stationary equilibria become
determinate.
Furthermore, we show that a tax-subsidy scheme can select a determinate eﬃcient
equilibrium. In other words, for a given equilibrium and for any real number δ>0,
a certain tax-subsidy scheme induces a locally determinate equilibrium within the δ-
neighborhood of the given equilibrium. Of course, the given equilibrium can be an
eﬃcient one, i.e., an equilibrium with high welfare. For that purpose, the size of the
tax-subsidy can be arbitrarily small.
It is well-known that, in the standard general equilibrium model, equilibria are
generically determinate and the lump-sum tax-subsidy only leads the economy to a
given Pareto eﬃcient equilibrium. On the other hand, in the money search model with
divisible money, equilibria are indeterminate and the tax-subsidy scheme has another
3role; namely, it makes an eﬃcient equilibrium determinate. In other words, we have
found a new role of tax-subsidy schemes which has not yet been known so far in the
literature.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we investigate a special model
which can be considered as Zhou [9]’s model with government agents. In Section 3,
we present a general model, to which most of random matching models with divisible
money belong, and investigate tax-subsidy schemes focusing on pure strategy equilibria.
Then in Section 4, we extend the results in Section 3 to the case of mixed strategy
equilibria. Finally, in Section 5, we conclude the paper with some discussion.
2 A Model with Government Agents
2.1 Model and Deﬁnitions
We ﬁrst present a simple model with government agents. Our model can be considered
as Zhou [9]’s model with government agents introduced by Aiyagari et al. [1].
There is a continuum of private agents with a mass of measure one. There are k ≥ 3
types of agents with equal fractions and the same number of types of goods. Let κ
be the reciprocal of k.A t y p e i − 1 agent can produce just one unit of type i good
and the production cost is c>0. (We assume that a type k agent produces type 1
good.) A type i agent obtains utility u>0 only when she consumes one unit of type
i good. We assume u>c . Time is continuous and pairwise random matchings take
place according to Poisson process with parameter µ>0. For every matched pair, the
seller posts a take-it-or-leave-it price oﬀer without knowing the amount of the buyer’s
money holdings. Let M>0 be the nominal stock of ﬁat money, and γ>0 be the
discount rate.
In what follows, we focus on a stationary distribution of money holdings of the
private agents with the support {0,p,...} for some p>0. Thus the money holdings
distribution can be expressed by hn,n =0 ,1,..., the measure of the set of private
agents with money holding np. Of course, h satisﬁes
 
nhn = 1 and hn ≥ 0 for all n.
We introduce government agents to this economy. They are “programmed” to follow
the rule speciﬁed later. That is, following the given rule, they collect tax from or give
subsidy to the agents they are matched with. We assume that government agents can
observe current money holdings of agents they are matched with. Let G>0 be the
measure of the government agents. Thus the total measure of all agents is 1+G. Note
4that in the following arguments G can be any small positive number. We describe
the policy of the government by (t0,t 1,...), where tn ∈ [−1,1]. When a government
agent meets an agent with η ∈ [np,(n +1 ) p), she gives subsidy p with probability |tn|
if tn > 0, while she collects tax p with probability |tn| if tn < 0. If the total amount
of tax is more than that of subsidy, the government absorbs the surplus, while if the
total amount of tax is less than that of subsidy, the government issues the necessary
amount.
We focus on stationary equilibria in which all agents with identical characteristics
act similar and in which all of the k types are symmetric. Since relevant decisions for
an agent are only what price she oﬀers to a buyer of her production good, and how
to respond to an oﬀer made by a seller of her consumption good, then we consider
her strategy as a pair of functions of money holdings: ω(η) ∈ R+ ∪{ NT}, an oﬀer
price, and ρ(η) ∈ R+, a reservation price, when her money holdings is η ∈ R+.1 Here,
ω(η)=NT implies that she rejects a trade. Since the reservation price cannot exceed
the buyer’s money holdings, ρ should satisfy the following feasibility condition:
ρ(η) ≤ η. (1)
We adopt one type of the Bayesian perfect equilibrium, called a stationary equilib-
rium, as our equilibrium concept. Since the rigorous deﬁnition is rather complicated,
then we present it in Appendix A. Instead, in Theorem 1 in the next subsection, we
present the conditions for stationary equilibria in the case with the following strategy.
Namely, we restrict our attention to a stationary equilibrium with the following strat-
egy both in the cases with and without tax-subsidy: there exists a positive integer N
such that
• a seller with η,0≤ η<N p , oﬀers p,
• a seller with η, η ≥ Np, oﬀers NT, and
• the reservation price of a buyer with η, η ≥ p, is more than or equal to p.
Note that if the above strategy is indeed an equilibrium, then on the equilibrium path,
all trades occur with p>0. Moreover, η>N pdoes not occur in the stationary
distribution; i.e., any n>Nis a transient state and N is the endogenously determined
upper bound of money holdings. Thus {0,p,...,Np} can be the support of a stationary
distribution with the strategy. In what follows, a stationary equilibrium in which all
trades occur with a single price is called a single price equilibrium (SPE).
1Throughout this section we focus on equilibria with pure strategies.
52.2 SPE without Tax-Subsidy
First, we consider the case that tn = 0 for all n, i.e., the case without tax-subsidy.
According to the strategy speciﬁed above, an agent moves out from np either by making
a sale or by making a purchase. More precisely, A type i agent with np < Np makes a
sale when she meets a type i+1 agent with money. The measure of agents with np is hn
and the probability that they can make a sale is
µκ
1+G(1−h0), and thus the set of agents
with measure
µκ
1+Ghn(1 − h0) moves out from np, i.e., it is an outﬂow at np as well as
an inﬂow at (n+1)p. On the other hand, a type i agent with np > 0 makes a purchase
when she meets a type i−1 agent with np < Np. The measure of agents with np is hn
and the probability that they can make a purchase is
µκ
1+G(1−hN), and thus the set of
agents with measure
µκ
1+Ghn(1 − hN) moves out from np, i.e., it is an outﬂow at np as
well as an inﬂow at (n − 1)p. Thus the stationary condition for h =( h0,h 1,...,h N),




[h1(1 − hN) − h0(1 − h0)] = 0, (2)
µκ
1+G
[{hn−1(1 − h0)+hn+1(1 − hN)}−hn{(1 − h0)+( 1− hN)}]=0 ,
1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1, (3)
µκ
1+G
[hN−1(1 − h0) − hN(1 − hN)] = 0, (4)
N  
n=0
hn =1 . (5)
Let the LHS of the nth equation be denoted by Dn(h), the diﬀerence between the inﬂow





n=0 nDn(h) = 0 always hold, i.e., they are identities. Thus if Dn(h) = 0 for
n =2 ,...,N hold, then D0(h) = 0 and D1(h) = 0 are automatically satisﬁed. In other
words, two of the above equations are redundant. Thus the above system of equations
has at least one degree of freedom.






,n =1 ,...,N, (6)
where hN is determined so that
hN(1 − hN)
N = h0(1 − h0)
N. (7)
6It is veriﬁed that for any h0 ∈ (0,1) there is the corresponding distribution h satisfy-
ing the stationary condition. In other words, we have a continuum of candidates for
stationary distributions.








φ(φ +1 ) 2N
(φ +1 ) N − 1
, (8)
holds for a positive integer N, where φ =
(1+G)γ
µκ .23Then, for some  >0, there exists
(h,V) such that (i) h0 ∈ (1 −  ,1) and hn,n=1 ,...,N, are given by (6) and (7), (ii)
V is a solution to the Bellman equation, and (iii) the strategy speciﬁed above is the
optimal policy function of the Bellman equation. For the deﬁnition of the Bellman
equation, see Appendix A.
Moreover, Kamiya et al. [5] show that, in SPEs, all the relevant incentive conditions
are satisﬁed with strict inequalities besides the boundary of the set of SPEs. Thus
even if we slightly perturb the equilibrium condition by introducing a policy with small
amounts of tax and subsidy, the incentive conditions still hold in most of equilibria
with the policy. Of course, for this argument, we need to check the regularity condition
for the implicit function theorem. It is checked in the next subsection.





(1 − h0)(1 − hN)
φ
(u − c).









, and that the maximum value







. Clearly, it constitutes the most eﬃcient SPE
among stationary equilibria with the upper bound of money holdings N if the incentive
conditions are satisﬁed.
2This deﬁnition of φ is slightly diﬀerent from the one deﬁned in Kamiya et al. [5]. For the details, see Remark 2 in
Appendix A.
3It is veriﬁed that there exists φ ≥ 0 such that
(φ +1 ) N <
φ(φ +1 ) 2N
(φ +1 ) N − 1
holds for φ>φ . In other words, there exists a region of parameter proﬁles (φ,u,c) satisfying the suﬃcient condition.
(See Kamiya et al. [5].)
72.3 SPE with Tax-Subsidy
We consider the case with tax-subsidy, i.e., t is a nonzero vector. In addition, we require
that t0 ≥ 0 and tN ≤ 0 throughout the paper so that the introduction of policy does
not change the support of money holdings distribution. According to the tax-subsidy
scheme and the strategy speciﬁed previously, an agent moves to np either by making
a sale from (n − 1)p, by making a purchase from (n +1 ) p, by obtaining subsidy from
(n−1)p, or by paying tax from (n+1)p. Thus, denoting by ˜ h a stationary distribution
















˜ hn−1(1 − ˜ h0)+˜ hn+1(1 − ˜ hN)+˜ hn−1kGt
+






(1 − ˜ h0)+( 1− ˜ hN)+kG|tn|˜ hn
  















˜ hn =1 , (12)
where t+
n = max{0,t n} and t−
n = −min{0,t n}. Let the nth equation be denoted by
˜ Dn(˜ h) = 0. As in the case with tax-subsidy,
 N
n=0 ˜ Dn(˜ h) = 0 is an identity, and thus
one of the above equations is redundant. On the other hand,
 N
n=0n ˜ Dn(˜ h)=0i sn o
longer an identity. Thus only one equation, say (9), is redundant and the system has
no degree of freedom. Then (h,V) is called a SPE with tax-subsidy if (10), (11), (12),
and the Bellman equation are satisﬁed.







, which is a
stationary distribution for the above strategy in the case without tax-subsidy. Suppose







, satisﬁes the Bellman equation
with the strict incentive condition.4 Let t =  τ where  >0 and τ =( τ0,0,...,0,τ N),
where   is a size of the scheme. Let τ0 = −τN > 0. Then we obtain a solution
˜ hn =
 ˜ h0 if n =0o rN,
˜ h0(1−˜ h0+kG τ0)
1−˜ h0 if 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1,
4The existence of such a V depends on the parameters and N.
8where ˜ h0 is a solution of the equation:
(N + 1)(˜ h0)
2 −{ 3+( N − 1)(1 + kG τ0)}˜ h0 +1=0 ,
with ˜ h0 ∈ (0,1). It is veriﬁed that such ˜ h0 is uniquely determined and thus ˜ h is






. Note that this
distribution is one of the stationary distributions without tax-subsidy and is orthogonal
to τ. If the regularity condition for the implicit function theorem holds, then V is also
a continuous function of   and the incentive condition holds for a small  >0. Thus







. Later, we show the
regularity in general.
We can generalize this method to approximate any given SPE with strict incentive
condition. Note that the budget deﬁcit is expressed as follows:
µG
1+G
˜ h · t =
µG
1+G
 ˜ h · τ =
N  
n=0
n ˜ Dn. (13)
Since we do not require budget balancing, then this may not be 0 out of equilibrium.
Thus
 N
n=0 n ˜ Dn = 0 is not an identity. This enables us to make a stationary dis-
tribution determinate. Let (h∗,V∗) be a SPE without tax-subsidy in which the strict
incentive condition holds. Then choose a τ satisfying h∗·τ = 0 and let t =  τ. Then the
equilibrium is determinate for  >0, and the equilibrium for  , denoted by (˜ h( ),V( ))
converges to (h∗,V∗)a s  → 0.
More precisely, in the stationarity condition (10)-(12), we can use ˜ h · τ = 0 instead
of ˜ D1 = 0. In other words, for  >0, the both conditions have the same solutions
because it follows from ˜ Dn = 0 for n =2 ,...,N, that ˜ h · τ = 0 imply ˜ D1 = 0, and
vice versa. We call the system of equations including ˜ h · τ = 0 the new system. Since
the new system is regular at   =0 ,h∗ is a determinate solution to the new system at
  = 0. For the regularity, see Appendix B. Thus (˜ h( ),V( )) converges to (h∗,V∗)a s
  → 0 by the implicit function theorem.
As stated in the previous subsecion, as long as we consider a small size tax-subsidy
scheme, introducing the scheme just slightly perturbs the incentive conditions. There-
fore if we pick up a relative interior point of the equilibrium manifold found in Theorem
1 as a goal, the incentive condition is not violated.
Note that the budget deﬁcit is zero in the stationary distribution, since ˜ Dn =0 ,n=
0,...,N, hold, although it is not identically zero.
The above arguments can be summarized as follows:
9Theorem 2 Suppose a SPE without tax-subsidy, in which the strategy speciﬁed in
Subsection 2.1, satisﬁes strict incentive conditions. Then, for any δ>0, there exists
a tax-subsidy scheme such that a SPE with the tax-subsidy is locally determinate and
lies in the δ-neighborhood of the SPE without tax-subsidy.
In Appendix C, we present the explicit solutions, including V in equilibria, with and
without tax-subsidy in case of N =1 .
2.4 Budget Balancing Rule
It is interesting to see that any tax-subsidy scheme with budget balancing rule cannot
make equilibria determinate. For example, consider stationary equilibria with N =2
and the tax-subsidy scheme with the form (t0,0,t 2). It is not the case that we can freely
choose both t0 and t2 because t0˜ h0 + t2˜ h2 = 0 must hold even out of the equilibrium




˜ h1(1 − ˜ h2) − ˜ h0
 






















˜ h1(1 − ˜ h0) − ˜ h2
 







˜ h0 + ˜ h1 + ˜ h2 =0 .















2 − h0 + kG−
 
(4 − 3˜ h0 + kG)(˜ h0 + kG)
2
.
Thus stationary distributions are indeterminate. The intuition is as follows. Requiring
budget balancing, we have one more additional variable t0, then the number of variables
is one larger than that of equations. Thus there is one degree of freedom in the system
of equations.




6 is necessary for t0 ≤ 1.
103 A General Model
In this section, we show the same results for a general model as in the previous section.
The private sector is slightly a special case of the one investigated by Kamiya and
Shimizu [6] (hereafter, we call KS simply).
There is a continuum of private agents with a mass of measure one. There are
k ≥ 3 types of agents with equal fractions and the same number of types of goods.
Let κ be the reciprocal of k.A t y p e i good is produced by a type i − 1 agent. A
type i agent obtains some positive utility only when she consumes type i good. We
make no assumption on the divisibility of goods. We assume that ﬁat money is durable
and perfectly divisible. Time is continuous, and pairwise random matchings take place
according to Poisson process with parameter µ>0.
We conﬁne our attention to the case that, for some positive number p, all trades
occur with its integer multiple amounts of money. In what follows, we focus on a
stationary distribution of economy-wide money holdings on {0,...,N} expressed by
h =( h0,...,h N), where hn is the measure of agents with np amount of money, and N<
∞ is the upper bound of the distribution. Our model includes the case of exogenously
determined N as well as the case of endogenously determined N. Of course, hn ≥ 0
and
 N
n=0 hn = 1 hold. Let M>0 be a given nominal stock of money circulating in
the private sector. Since p is uniquely determined by
 N
n=0 pnhn = M for a given h
for h0  = 1, then, deleting p from {0,p,...,Np}, the set {0,...,N} can be considered
as the state space.
Since we adopt a general framework, then various types of bargaining procedures
are allowed.6 An agent with n, or an agent with np amount of money, chooses an action
in An = {an1,...,a nsn}. Let A =Π N
n=0An. For example, an action consists of an oﬀer
price and a reservation price. In this section, we conﬁne our attention to the stationary
equilibrium in which all agents choose pure strategies. As for mixed strategy equilibria,
see Section 4. Let S =
 N
n=0 sn. Given an equilibrium action proﬁle a =( a0,...,a N),
where an is the action taken at np in the equilibrium, deﬁne α(a)={(n,j) | an = anj}.
The monetary transition resulted from transaction among a matched pair is de-
scribed by a function f. When an agent with money holdings np and action anj meets
an agent with n p and an j , the former’s and the latter’s states, i.e., money holdings,
will be n+f(n,j;n ,j ) and n −f(n,j;n ,j ), respectively. That is f maps an ordered
pair (n,j;n ,j ) to a non-negative integer f(n,j;n ,j ). Here “ordered” means, for ex-
6See Remark 1 for the details.
11ample, that the former is a seller and the latter is a buyer. When N is exogenously
determined, we assume
N ≥ n + f(n,j;n
 ,j
 ) and n
  − f(n,j;n
 ,j
 ) ≥ 0.
When N is endogenously determined, we assume the latter condition while the former
one should be satisﬁed on the equilibrium path.
Next, we introduce government agents. They are programmed to follow a rule which
prescribes them how to collect tax from or give subsidy to the agents they are matched
with. We assume that government agents can observe current money holdings of agents
they are matched with. Let G>0 be the measure of the government agents. Thus the
total measure of agents is 1 + G. Note that in the following arguments G can be any
small positive number.
Then we describe government’s policy by (t0,t 1,...,t N), where tn ∈ [−1,1], t0 ≥ 0,
and tN ≤ 0. Each government agent gives subsidy p to the matched agent with n with
probability |tn| when tn > 0, while she collects tax p with probability |tn| when tn < 0.
As seen in the previous section, the budget of the government may not be balanced
out of equilibria.
Let θ ∈ RL be the parameters of the model besides t. Of course, θ includes k, µ,
and G.
We adopt Bellman equation approach. Let Vn be the value of state n, n =0 ,...,N.
The variables in the model are denoted by x =( h,V,a). Let Wnj(x;θ,t) be the value of
action j at state n. Thus, in equilibria, Wnj(x;θ,t)=Vn holds for (n,j) ∈ α(a). Note
that Wnj(x;θ,t) includes the utility and/or the production cost of perishable goods.
3.1 Stationary Equilibria without Tax-Subsidy




hn if anj = an,
0i f anj  = an.
Then by the random matching assumption and the deﬁnition of f, the inﬂow In into
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 ;n,j) > 0}.
We denote In−On by Dn. Then the condition for stationarity is Dn = 0 for n =0 ,...,N
and
 N
n=0hn = 1. Clearly,
 N
n=0 Dn = 0 holds as an identity, and thus at least one
equation is redundant. The following theorem shows that one more equation is always
redundant.





Suppose that two agents, say a buyer and a seller, meet and a monetary trade occurs.
Then the amount of money the buyer pays is equal to that of the seller obtains; in
other words, the sum of their money holdings before trade is equal to that after trade.
Since this holds in each trade, the total amount of money before trades, expressed by
 N
n=0 pnOn(h,a;θ), is equal to the total amount of money after trades, expressed by
 N
n=0 pnIn(h,a;θ), and thus
 N
n=0 nDn(h,a;θ) = 0 always holds.
Together with the other identity
 N
n=0 Dn(h,a;θ) = 0, the above theorem implies
that h is a stationary distribution if and only if Dn(h,a;θ)=0 ,n =2 ,...,N, and
 N
n=0 hn = 1 hold. Namely, the condition for stationarity has at least one-degree of
freedom. This is the main cause of the indeterminacy.
Now the equilibrium condition is expressed as follows:
13Deﬁnition 1 Given θ, x =( h,V,a) ∈ RN+1×R
N+1
+ ×A is a (pure strategy) stationary
equilibrium without tax-subsidy if it satisﬁes the following:
Dn(h,a;θ)=0 ,n =2 ,...,N
N  
n=0
hn − 1=0 ,
Vn − Wnj(x;θ,0) = 0, (n,j) ∈ α(a)
Vn − Wnj(x;θ,0) ≥ 0, (n,j) / ∈ α(a). (15)
(h,V ) is called a stationary equilibrium for a and θ if (h,V,a) is a stationary equilib-
rium for θ. Let Ea
θ be the set of such (h,V )s, and ga : R
N+1
+ ×RN+1×RL(  (h,V,θ)) →
RN−1 × R × RN+1 × RS−N−1 be the LHS of the above condition.
Remark 1 In addition to the above equilibrium conditions, the following conditions
are typically required to be an “equilibrium” in most of matching models with money:
(i) the existence of p>0 satisfying
 N
n=0 pnhn = M, (ii) the incentive not to choose
an action out of our action space,7 and (iii) the incentive to take the equilibrium
strategy at state η/ ∈{ 0,p,...,Np}. However, they are not very restrictive. As for
(i), it immediately follows from h0  = 1. As for (ii) and (iii), KS presents a suﬃcient
condition to assure that (ii) and (iii) hold, and it is satisﬁed in all of the matching
models with divisible money known so far, such as Zhou [9]’s model, a divisible money





      
2N+1
×R++ ×···×R++       
S−N−1
,
and, for (n,j) / ∈ α(a),
C
a(n,j) = {0}×···×{0}
      
2N+1
×R++ ×···×R++ ×{ 0}×R++ ×···×R++       
S−N−1
,
where the last {0} corresponds to Vn−Wnj(x;θ,0). Moreover, for (n,j),(n ,j ) / ∈ α(a),
C
a(n,j)(n ,j ) = {0}×···×{0}
      
2N+1
×R ×···×R ×{ 0}×R ×···×R ×{ 0}×R ×···×R
      
S−N−1
,
7For example in Section 2, a seller may oﬀer a price which is not an integer multiple of p.
14where the last two {0}s correspond to Vn −Wnj(x;θ,0) and Vn −Wn j (x;θ,0), respec-
tively. Below, it is veriﬁed that there is the indeterminacy of the stationary equilibrium
under some regularity conditions.
Assumption 1 [Regularity Condition] Given a, ga is of class C2 and is transversal to
Ca, Ca(n,j), and Ca(n,j)(n ,j ) for all (n,j) / ∈ α(a) and (n ,j ) / ∈ α(a).8
Assumption 2 [Existence Condition] Given a, there exists a C2-manifold without
boundary, Θ ⊂ RL, such that Ea
θ  = ∅ holds for all θ ∈ Θ.
Theorem 4 (Kamiya and Shimizu [6]) For a given a, suppose the Regularity Condition
and the Existence Condition are satisﬁed for some Θ. Then, for almost every θ ∈ Θ,
Ea
θ is a one-dimensional manifold with boundary. Moreover, at any endpoint of the
manifold, only one Vn −Wnj(x;θ,0) ≥ 0, (n,j) / ∈ α(a), is binding, and at points in the
relative interior of the manifold, no inequality is binding.
KS also shows that this indeterminacy is indeed a real one; i.e., the welfare are
typically not the same in a connected component of the equilibrium manifold.
3.2 Stationary Equilibria with Tax-Subsidy
In this section, we investigate the case with t  =( 0 ,...,0). In what follows, variables
and functions with “tilde” denote the ones with nonzero t. The inﬂow at n, ˜ In, and
the outﬂow at n, ˜ On, are deﬁned as follows:
















n = max{0,t n}, t−
n = −min{0,t n}, and t−1 = tN+1 = 0. Let ˜ Dn(˜ h,a;θ,t)=
˜ In(˜ h,a;θ,t) − ˜ On(˜ h,a;θ,t).
Since
 N
n=0 n ˜ Dn is not identically zero, then we deﬁne a stationary equilibrium with
tax-subsidy as follows.
Deﬁnition 2 Given θ,˜ x =( ˜ h, ˜ V,a ) ∈ RN+1×R
N+1
+ ×A is a (pure strategy) stationary
8This assumption implies that that Dn =0 ,n=2 ,...,N, are linearly independent in stationary equilibria. See KS
for indeterminacy results of the other cases.
15equilibrium with tax-subsidy scheme t if it satisﬁes the following:
˜ Dn(˜ h,a;θ,t)=0 ,n =1 ,...,N
N  
n=0
˜ hn − 1=0 ,
˜ Vn − Wnj(˜ x;θ,t)=0 , (n,j) ∈ α(a)
˜ Vn − Wnj(˜ x;θ,t) ≥ 0, (n,j) / ∈ α(a). (16)
Theorem 5 Given a, consider the following system of the stationary condition:
( ˜ D1,..., ˜ DN,
N  
n=0
˜ hn − 1)
T =( 0 ,...,0)
T,
where T denotes transpose. If the Jacobian matrix with respect to ˜ h of the LHS of the
above system is of full rank at a stationary distribution, then the stationary distribution
is locally determinate. Moreover, the budget is balanced on this stationary distribution.
Proof:
The ﬁrst statement follows from the inverse function theorem. As for the second state-
ment, it is veriﬁed that the budget deﬁcit is equal to
µG
1+G
˜ h · t =
N  
n=0







n ˜ Dn(˜ h,a;θ,t),
where the second equality follows from Theorem 3. Note that even in the case with
tax-subsidy the same logic as in Theorem 3 applies. Then
 N
n=0 nDn(˜ h,a;θ) is equal
to 0 in stationary distributions with tax-subsidy, since ˜ Dn(˜ h,a;θ,t)=0 ,n=0 ,...,N.
Next, we show the existence of a locally determinate stationary equilibrium which
has the following property; it is induced by a certain tax-subsidy scheme, and it exists
in any given neighborhood of the stationary equilibrium which is not induced by tax-
subsidy. We choose an arbitrary stationary equilibrium without tax-subsidy, denoted
by x∗ =( h∗,V∗,a ∗), which is in the relative interior of the equilibrium manifold. Thus,
by Theorem 4, (15) is satisﬁed with strict inequalities.
First we can ﬁnd the following vector:
16Lemma 1 There exists an (N + 1)-dimensional vector τ satisfying







· τ = 0 for n =2 ,...,N,
(c) h∗ · τ =0 .
The above lemma clearly holds, since (b) and (c) have at least one-degree of freedom.
Using this vector, we construct a tax-subsidy scheme t =  τ. Here  >0 is the size of
the policy. For such a t to be a tax-subsidy scheme, we need the following assumption:
Assumption 3 It is also satisﬁed for τ in Lemma 1 that
(d) τN ≤ 0, and
(e) τ0 ≥ 0.
Next, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 4 Wnj is C2 with respect to   for any (n,j).
If this assumption holds and   is suﬃciently small, then all the incentive conditions in
the case with tax-subsidy is also satisﬁed. Thus a∗ is also an equilibrium action even
in the case with tax-subsidy. In other words, (˜ h, ˜ V,a ∗) such that (˜ h, ˜ V ) is in the neigh-
borhood of (h∗,V∗) and satisﬁes the following conditions is a stationary equilibrium
for suﬃciently small  >0.
˜ Dn(˜ h,a
∗;θ, τ)=0 ,n =1 ,...,N (17)
N  
n=0
˜ hn − 1=0 , (18)
˜ Vn − Wnj(˜ h, ˜ V,a
∗;θ, τ)=0 , (n,j) ∈ α(a
∗). (19)
Let ˜ ga∗
  (˜ h, ˜ V ) be the LHS of the above equations. Then the set of stationary equilibria
is equivalent to the solution set of ˜ ga∗
  (˜ h, ˜ V )=( 0 ,...,0)T.
Furthermore, we construct ˆ ga∗
  by replacing ˜ D1 in ˜ ga∗
  by ˜ h · τ. Then for  >0, the
solution set of ˜ ga∗
  (˜ h, ˜ V )=( 0 ,...,0)T is equivalent to the solution set of ˆ ga∗




˜ h · τ =
N  
n=0
n ˜ Dn (20)
holds on any stationary equilibrium. More precisely, in the stationarity condition (17),
we can use ˜ h · τ = 0 instead of ˜ D1 = 0. In other words, for  >0, the both conditions
17have the same solutions because it follows from ˜ D2 =0 ,..., ˜ DN = 0, and (20) that
˜ h · τ = 0 imply ˜ D1 = 0, and vice versa. In the following lemma, we show that if
the Regularity Condition is satisﬁed, (h∗,V∗) is a determinate solution to ˆ ga∗
  (˜ h, ˜ V )=
(0,...,0)T at   =0 . T h u s( ˜ h( ), ˜ V( )) converges to (h∗,V∗)a s  → 0 by the implicit
function theorem.
Lemma 2 Under the Regularity Condition and Assumption 3, the Jacobian matrix of
ˆ ga∗
0 with respect to (˜ h, ˜ V ) is of full rank at (h∗,V∗).
Proof:






















































where j(n) is deﬁned as (n,j(n)) ∈ α(a∗) and JV(Vn − Wnj(n)) is the Jacobian ma-
trix with respect to V =( V0,V 1,...,V N), then it suﬃces to show that the upper-left
submatrix and the lower-right submatrix are of full rank. The Regularity condition
implies that the lower-right submatrix is of full rank. As for the upper-left submatrix,
condition (b) implies that the 1st row vector is independent of the 2nd,...,and Nth
row vectors. Next, conditions (a), (d), and (e) imply that the 1st row vector is inde-
pendent of the last row vector. By the Regularity Condition, the 2nd ,...,and Nth
row vectors are mutually independent. Finally, by the Regularity Condition, the last
row vector is independent of 2nd,...,and Nth row vectors.
Thus (h∗,V∗) is a locally determinate solution to ˆ ga∗
0 =( 0 ,...,0)T. Then applying
the implicit function theorem to ˆ ga∗
  =( 0 ,...,0)T at (˜ h, ˜ V,  )=( h∗,V∗,0), it can be
clearly shown that, for all δ>0, there exist  >0 and (h∗
 ,V∗
  ) such that (h∗
 ,V∗
  ) is the
locally unique solution to ˜ ga∗
  =( 0 ,...,0)T and is in the δ-neighborhood of (h∗,V∗).
Finally, since (h∗,V∗) is in the relative interior of the equilibrium manifold, all the
incentive conditions are still satisﬁed for a suﬃciently small  . Thus we obtain the
following theorem.
18Theorem 6 Suppose the Regularity Condition, the Existence Condition, and Assump-
tions 3 and 4 hold. Then, for almost every θ ∈ Θ, almost every (h∗,V∗) ∈ Ea∗
θ , and any
δ-neighborhood of (h∗,V∗), there exists a tax-subsidy scheme such that a stationary
equilibrium with tax-subsidy is locally determinate and lies in the neighborhood.
4 Mixed Strategy Equilibria
In this section we deal with mixed strategy stationary equilibria.
Let bnj ≥ 0 be the proportion of the agents choosing an action anj among the agents
with n, and b =( b01,...,b nj,...,b NsN). Thus
 sn
j=1bnj = 1 holds. Then an equilibrium
is deﬁned in terms of x =( h,V,b).
First, we present the results in the case without tax-subsidy. Let hnj = bnjhn. Then
In and On are deﬁned similarly as in the previous section. Then we obtain the following
result similar to Theorem 3.





Let ˆ B be the power set of {(n,j) | j =1 ,...,s n,n =0 ,...,N} and B be {β ∈
ˆ B |∀ n,∃j,(n,j) ∈ β}. β ∈ B can be considered as a set of actions used in an
equilibrium. For a given β ∈ B, let
Ω
β = {(bnj)(n,j)∈β | bnj > 0 for (n,j) ∈ β}. (22)
Let xβ =( V,h,bβ), where bβ ∈ Ωβ. For a given β ∈ B, W
β
nj(xβ;θ,t) is deﬁned from
Wnj(x;θ,t) by setting bn j  = 0 for any (n ,j ) / ∈ β. In parallel with this, Dβ
n(h,bβ;θ)i s
deﬁned.











β;θ)=0 ,n =2 ,...,N
N  
n=0




β;θ,0) = 0, (n,j) ∈ β
 
j∈{j |(j ,n)∈β}




β;θ,0) ≥ 0, (n,j) / ∈ β. (23)
Let E
β
θ be the set of such an xβ, and gβ : RN+1 × R
N+1
++ × Ωβ × RL → RN−1 × R ×




      
2N+#β+1
×R++ ×···×R++       
S−#β
,
and, for (n,j) / ∈ β,
C
β(n,j) = {0}×···×{0}
      
2N+#β+1
×R++ ×···×R++ ×{ 0}×R++ ×···×R++       
S−#β
,
where the last {0} corresponds to Vn − W
β
nj(xβ;θ,0). Moreover, for (n,j),(n ,j ) / ∈ β
such that (n,j)  =( n ,j ),
C
β(n,j)(n ,j ) = {0}×···×{0}
      
2N+#β+1
×R ×···×R ×{ 0}×R ×···×R ×{ 0}×R ×···×R
      
S−#β
,
where the last two {0}s correspond to Vn − W
β




Assumption 5 [Regularity Condition] Given β, gβ is C2 and is transversal to Cβ,
Cβ(n,j), and Cβ(n,j)(n ,j ) for all (n,j) / ∈ β and (n ,j ) / ∈ β.
Assumption 6 [Existence Condition] Given β, there exists C2 manifold without
boundary, Θ ⊂ RL such that E
β
θ  = ∅ holds for all θ ∈ Θ.
20Theorem 8 (Kamiya and Shimizu [6]) For a given β, suppose the Regularity Condition
and the Existence Condition is satisﬁed for Θ. Then, for almost every θ ∈ Θ, E
β
θ is a
one-dimensional manifold with boundary. Moreover, at any endpoint of the manifold,
only one Vn − Wnj(x;θ,0) ≥ 0, (n,j) / ∈ β, is binding, and at points in the relative
interior of the manifold, no inequality is binding.
Based on these results, we investigate the case with tax-subsidy. First, we obtain
almost the same result as Theorem 5.








˜ hn − 1)
T =( 0 ,...,0)
T.
If the Jacobian matrix with respect to ˜ h of the LHS of the above system is of full rank
at a stationary distribution, then the stationary distribution is locally determinate.
Moreover, the budget is balanced on this stationary distribution.
Next, we ﬁx an arbitrary stationary equilibrium without tax-subsidy, denoted by
x∗,9 which is in the relative interior of the equilibrium manifold.
We construct a tax-subsidy scheme such that t =  τ. To do so, we need the following
Lemma and Assumption.
Lemma 3 There exists an (N + 1)-dimensional vector τ satisfying










· τ = 0 for n =2 ,...,N,
(c) h∗ · τ =0 .
Assumption 7 It is also satisﬁed for τ in Lemma 3 that
(d) τN ≤ 0, and
(e) τ0 ≥ 0.
Also we make the following assumption.
Assumption 8 ˜ W
β∗
nj is C2 with respect to   for any (n,j).
9To be strict, we should denote by x∗β∗
, but we simply do by x∗ to avoid a complicated notation.
21As in the case of pure strategies, for a suﬃciently small  , we express the condition for
a stationary equilibrium with tax-subsidy as follows:
˜ D
β∗
n (˜ h,˜ b
β∗
;θ, τ)=0 ,n =1 ,...,N
N  
n=0
˜ hn − 1=0 ,




;θ, τ)=0 , (n,j) ∈ β
∗.
Let ˜ gβ∗
  (˜ xβ∗
) be the LHS of the above equations. Then the set of stationary equilibria
is equivalent to the solution set of ˜ gβ∗
  (˜ xβ∗
)=( 0 ,...,0)T.
Furthermore, we construct ˆ gβ∗
  by replacing ˜ D
β∗
1 in ˜ gβ∗
  by ˜ h · τ. Then for  >0,
the solution set of ˜ gβ∗
  (˜ xβ∗
)=( 0 ,...,0)T is equivalent to the solution set of ˆ gβ∗
  (˜ xβ∗
)=
(0,...,0)T. We need to make the assumption on ˆ ga∗
  :
Assumption 9 The Jacobian matrix of ˆ g
β∗
0 with respect to ˜ xβ∗
is of full rank at x∗.
This assumption implies x∗ is a locally determinate solution to ˆ g
β∗
0 =( 0 ,...,0)T.
Then applying the implicit function theorem to ˆ gβ∗
  =( 0 ,...,0)T at (xβ∗, )=( x∗,0),
it can be clearly shown that, for any δ>0, there exist  >0 and (x∗
  such that x∗
 
is the locally unique solution to ˜ gβ∗
  =( 0 ,...,0)T and is in the δ-neighborhood of x∗.
Finally, since x∗ is in the relative interior of the equilibrium manifold, all the incentive
conditions are still satisﬁed for a suﬃciently small  . Thus we obtain the following
theorem.
Theorem 10 Suppose the Regularity Condition, the Existence Condition, and As-
sumptions 8 and 9 hold. Then for almost every θ ∈ Θ, almost every x∗ ∈ E
β∗
θ , and
any δ-neighborhood of x∗, there exists a tax-subsidy scheme such that a stationary
equilibrium with tax-subsidy is locally determinate and lies in the neighborhood.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that although there is a continuum of stationary equilibria in
money search models, some tax-subsidy schemes can select a determinate eﬃcient one
among them. In other words, we ﬁnd a new role of the tax-subsidy schemes. It is
notable that a small amount of tax-subsidy is enough for this role.
If the amounts of tax and subsidy are relatively large, the government may obtain
a more eﬃcient equilibrium than those without tax-subsidy. Thus it is the most im-
22portant future research to seek for the best policy allowing for a tax-subsidy scheme of
relatively large amounts.
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Appendix
23A The Deﬁnition of Stationary Equilibrium in Zhou’s Model
From h, the stationary distribution of oﬀer prices, Ω, and the stationary distribution











Let V : R+ → R+ be a value function. Then, using γ, µ, and h, the Bellman equation







   r
0







p |V(η + sign(t 
η






where  y  is the integer part of y, and
S(o)=
 
R(o)V(η)+( 1− R(o)) (V(η + o) − c), if o ∈ R+,
V(η), if o = NT.
(27)
The ﬁrst term in the bracket of the RHS of (26) is the value when an agent is a buyer,
the second term is the value when she is a seller, and the third term is the value
when she meets a government agent. If ρ(η) and ω(η) are the maximizers of the above




   ρ(η)
0
(u + V(η − x))dΩ(x)+( 1− Ω(ρ(η)))V(η)+S(ω(η))
+( kG|t 
η
p |V(η + sign(t 
η





In terms of V(η), it is optimal to accept oﬀer o ∈ R+ if u + V(η − o) ≥V(η). That
is the optimal oﬀer strategy ρ satisﬁes ρ(η) ≥ o if and only if u+V(η −o) ≥V(η). For
the perfectness of equilibria, this should hold even in oﬀ-equilibrium-paths. Then, in
case that a value function is continuous from the right, the perfectness condition with





 u + V(η − r) ≥V(η)
 
. (29)
That is, type i’s reservation price is her full value for good i+1, and thus it is a function
of η. In order to assure that (29) is actually deﬁned, we conﬁne our attention to the
case that a value function is continuous from the right.
The economy is stationary if h is an initial stationary distribution of the process in-
duced by the optimal trading strategy (ω, ρ). Now we deﬁne the stationary equilibrium
grounded on the above.
Deﬁnition 4  h,ω,ρ,V , where V is a step function with step p>0, is said to be a
stationary equilibrium if
1. h is stationary under trading strategies ω and ρ, and the distribution of oﬀer prices
Ω and that of reservation prices R are derived from (24) and (25),
2.
 N
n=0pnhn = M, and
3. given the distributions h, R and Ω, the reservation price strategy ρ satisﬁes the
feasibility condition (1) and the perfectness condition (29), respectively, and the
value function V, together with ρ and ω, solves the Bellman equation (26).





   ρ(η)
0
{u + V(η − x)}dΩ(x)+{1 − Ω(ρ(η))}V(η)+S(ω(η))
 
.
This is essentially the same as the value function in Zhou [9], though the deﬁnition of
φ is slightly diﬀerent. Thus all the results in Zhou [9] and Kamiya et al. [5] hold even
in our model with t =( 0 ,...,0).
25B The Regularity of Single Price Equilibria
Let Vn = V(np),n =0 ,1,.... Then ˜ h =( ˜ h0,...,˜ hN) and ˜ V =( ˜ V0,...,˜ VN) should
satisfy the following equations in stationary equilibria:
F0 = ˜ h0 + ···+ ˜ hN − 1=0 , (30)
F1 = ˜ h · τ =0 , (31)
Fn = ˜ hn−1(1 − ˜ h0)+˜ hn+1(1 − ˜ hN)+kG (t
+
n−1˜ hn−1 + t
−
n+1˜ hn+1)
− ˜ hn(1 − ˜ h0 +1− ˜ hN + kG |τn|)=0 ,n =2 ,...,N− 1, (32)
FN = ˜ hN−1(1 − ˜ h0)+kG τ
+
N−1˜ hN−1 − ˜ hN(1 − ˜ hN)+kG τN˜ hN =0 , (33)




(1 − ˜ h0)(˜ V1 − c)+˜ h0˜ V0 + ˜ V0
+kG τ0˜ V1 + kG(1 −  τ0)˜ V0
 
=0 , (34)




(1 − ˜ h0)(˜ Vn+1 − c)+˜ h0 ˜ Vn +( 1− ˜ hN)(u + ˜ Vn−1)+˜ hN ˜ Vn
+kG τ
+
n ˜ Vn+1 + kG τ
−
n ˜ Vn−1 + kG(1 −  |τn|)˜ Vn
 
=0 ,n =1 ,...,N− 1, (35)




˜ VN +( 1− ˜ hN)(u + ˜ VN−1)+˜ hN ˜ VN




n = max{0,t n} and t−
n = −min{0,t n}. (30) simply says that the total measure
is one. (31) is the equation introduced instead of the stationarity condition at n =1 .
(32) and (33) are the conditions for stationary of money holdings distribution. The last
three equations (34)-(36) are the conditions that the speciﬁed strategy indeed realizes
the value.
Next, let Ψ : RN+1 × RN+1 × R × RN+1 → RN+1 × RN+1 be deﬁned as
Ψ
 
˜ h, ˜ V , ,τ
 
=( F0,...,F N,G 0,...,G N)(˜ h, ˜ V , ,τ).
Recall that (h∗,V∗) is a SPE without tax-subsidy. Clearly, Ψ(h∗,V∗,0,τ) = 0 holds
for any τ. Note that Ψ is C2. For a given τ, if the determinant of Ψ w.r.t. (˜ h, ˜ V )a t
(h∗,V∗,0,τ) is not zero, then by the implicit function theorem, Ψ(˜ h, ˜ V , ,τ) = 0 can be
solved for (˜ h, ˜ V ) in terms of  , in a small neighborhood of (h∗,V∗), and these functions
are continuously diﬀerentiable functions of  .
We restrict our attention to the set of τ1,...,τ N such that
 N
n=1 τnh∗
n < 0 and h





0 . The Jacobian matrix of Ψ w.r.t.







where Υ1 and Υ2 are the Jacobian matrices of (F0,...,F N) and (G0,...,G N) w.r.t. ˜ h,
respectively, Υ4 is the Jacobian matrix (G0,...,G N) w.r.t. ˜ V , and Υ3 and Υ5 are the
Jacobian matrices of (F0,...,F N) and (G0,...,G N) w.r.t. τ1,...,τ N, respectively.










n=0 τn  =0 .
Then, for any (˜ h, ˜ V,τ 1,...,τ N) satisfying Ψ
 
˜ h, ˜ V,0,τ
 









is the unique stationary distribution satisfying ˜ hN =
1
N+1, (30),














τn  =0 .
Note that if ˜ hN  = 1
N+1 holds, then ˜ hN  = ˜ h0 holds in stationary distributions satisfying
(30), (32) and (33).
Then we will show that A is always of full rank at equilibria in the set of (τ1,...,τ N)
such that
 N
n=0 τn  = 0, and thus by the parametric transversality theorem the Jacobian
matrix of Ψ w.r.t. ˜ h and ˜ V is of full rank at an equilibrium for almost every τ1,...,τ N
in the set. To see this, we show that, Υ4 and the matrix consists of the ﬁrst column of
Υ3 and the second to the last column of Υ1, denoted by Υ6, are of full rank.














1 ... ... 1
τ0 ... ... τ N
−˜ h1 + ˜ h2 1 − ˜ h0 −2+˜ h0 + ˜ hN 1 − ˜ hN 0 ... ... 0 ˜ h2 − ˜ h3
. . .
−˜ hN−3 + ˜ hN−2 0 ... ... 01 − ˜ h0 −2+˜ h0 + ˜ hN 1 − ˜ hN ˜ hN−2 − ˜ hN−1
−˜ hN−2 + ˜ hN−1 0 ... ... 01 − ˜ h0 −2+˜ h0 + ˜ hN 1+˜ hN−1 − 2˜ hN















































˜ h1 τ1 ... τ N
01 − ˜ h0 −2+˜ h0 + ˜ hN 1 − ˜ hN ... ... 0 ˜ h2 − ˜ h3
. . .
00 ... ... 01 − ˜ h0 −2+˜ h0 + ˜ hN 1 − ˜ hN ˜ hN−2 − ˜ hN−1
00 ... ... 01 − ˜ h0 −2+˜ h0 + ˜ hN 1+˜ hN−1 − 2˜ hN



































0 −1+˜ hN 0 ... ... 0 ˜ h1
˜ h1 τ1 ... τ N
01 − ˜ h0 −1+˜ hN 0 ... ... 0 ˜ h2
00 1 − ˜ h0 −1+˜ hN 0 ... ... 0 ˜ h3
. . .
00 ... ... 01 − ˜ h0 −1+˜ hN 0 ˜ hN−2
00 ... ... 01 − ˜ h0 −1+˜ hN ˜ hN−1






































−1+˜ hN 0 ... ... 0 ˜ h1
1 − ˜ h0 −1+˜ hN 0 ... ... 0 ˜ h2
01 − ˜ h0 −1+˜ hN 0 ... ... 0 ˜ h3
. . .
0 ... ... 01 − ˜ h0 −1+˜ hN 0 ˜ hN−2
0 ... ... 01 − ˜ h0 −1+˜ hN ˜ hN−1










































˜ h0, |Υ6| at   = 0 is expressed as follows:
|Υ6| =
˜ h1(−1+˜ hN)N−1




1 − ˜ h0
1 − ˜ hN
 N





˜ h0 − ˜ hN
 




˜ h0 − ˜ hN
 
(N +1 ) ˜ hN − 1
 
 =0 .
Thus by the parametric transversality theorem |Υ1|  = 0 holds in stationary distribu-
tions for almost every (τ1,...,τ N) in the space.
















φ +1− ˜ h0 −1+˜ h0 0 ... ... 0
−1+˜ hN φ +2− ˜ h0 − ˜ hN −1+˜ h0 0 ... ... 0
. . .
0 ... ... 0 −1+˜ hN φ +2− ˜ h0 − ˜ hN −1+˜ h0



























(N +1 ) φ + N −N 0 ... ... 0
−N (N +1 ) φ +2 N −N 0 ... ... 0
. . .
0 ... ... 0 −N (N +1 ) φ +2 N −N












28Then deﬁning (υn)n=0,...,N as
υ0 =( N +1 ) φ + N,
υn =( N +1 ) φ +2 N −
N2
υn−1
,n =1 ,...,N− 1,








(φ +2+kG)N+1(N +1 ) N+1.
Since we can show that
υ0 >N ,
υn−1 >N⇒ υn >N ,
for n =1 ,...,N− 1, and
υN−1 >N⇒ υN > 0,
then |Υ4| > 0 holds at   =0 .
Next, we consider the case of h∗
0 = ··· = h∗
N =
1
N+1. In this case, for any
(˜ h, ˜ V,τ 1,...,τ n) such that Ψ
 
˜ h, ˜ V,0,τ
 
=0 ,˜ h0 = ··· = ˜ hN =
1
N+1 holds. There-
fore we can directly show that Υ4 and Υ1 are of full rank for almost every τ1,...,τ N.


















1 ... ... 1
τ0 ... ... τ N
−˜ h1 + ˜ h2 1 − ˜ h0 −2+˜ h0 + ˜ hN 1 − ˜ hN 0 ... ... 0 ˜ h2 − ˜ h3
. . .
−˜ hN−3 + ˜ hN−2 0 ... ... 01 − ˜ h0 −2+˜ h0 + ˜ hN 1 − ˜ hN ˜ hN−2 − ˜ hN−1
−˜ hN−2 + ˜ hN−1 0 ... ... 01 − ˜ h0 −2+˜ h0 + ˜ hN 1+˜ hN−1 − 2˜ hN



































1 ... ... 1
τ0 ... ... τ N
0 N −2NN 0 ... ... 0
. . .
0 ... ... 0 N −2NN 0
0 ... ... 0 N −2NN














































00−N 0 ... ... 0
00 0 −N 0 ... ... 0
. . .
0 ... ... 0 −N 0
























29Then choosing any τ satisfying
 N
n=1 nτn  = 0 and
 N
n=0 τn =0 ,|Υ1| is nonzero at
  = 0. In other words, for almost every τ1,...,τ N, |Υ1|  =0a t  = 0. Moreover, as
shown in the previous case, |Υ4| > 0 holds at   =0 .
Therefore the Jacobian matrix of Ψ w.r.t. (˜ h, ˜ V ) is nonzero. Then, by the implicit
function theorem, Vn( ),n=0 ,...,N, and ˜ h( ),n=0 ,...,N are C1 functions of  .





˜ Vn( )+( 1− ˜ hN( ))(u + ˜ Vn−1( )) + ˜ hn( )˜ Vn( )
 
,n= N +1 ,N+2 ,...,
and ˜ V (η)( )=˜ V 
η
p ( ). Note that strict incentive conditions at n =0 ,1,...,N imply
those at all η ∈ R+.
C SPEs with N =1
We ﬁrst consider the case without tax-subsidy. The stationarity condition for h =
(h0,h 1) is expressed as
µκ
1+G
[h1(1 − h1) − h0(1 − h0)] = 0,
µκ
1+G
[h0(1 − h0) − h1(1 − h1)] = 0,
h0 + h1 =1 .
However, for any h0 ∈ (0,1), h =( h0,1 − h0) satisﬁes the stationarity condition. Also













[Vn +( 1− h1)(u + Vn−1)+h1Vn + kGVn],n ≥ 1.









 n φ + h0
φ +1




V(η)=V ( η/p ).
Then all we have to do is to check the incentive conditions.
The incentive conditions with strict inequalities are as follows:
− c + V1 >V 0,
Vn > −c + Vn+1,n ≥ 1,
u + Vn−1 >V n,n ≥ 1.
The ﬁrst inequality is the condition that an agent with no money has incentive to sell
her production good. The second inequality is the condition that an agent with np does
not have incentive to sell her production good. The third inequality is the condition
that an agent with np has incentive to accept an oﬀer price p. Note that the conditions
at the other η follow from the above condition. (See Zhou [9].) The necessary and








(h0)2 +1 . (37)




< (φ +1 )
2, (38)





, the corresponding h and V constitute a station-
ary equilibrium in which all the relevant incentive conditions are satisﬁed with strict
inequalities.





It is easily seen that W has a single peak at h =( 1 /2,1/2) with W = u−c
4φ .
Now consider the case with tax-subsidy. We consider the tax-subsidy scheme t =  τ.










˜ h0(˜ h1 + kG τ0) − ˜ h1(˜ h0 − kG τ1)
 
=0 ,
˜ h0 + ˜ h1 =1 .
10The following condition is slightly diﬀerent from the one obtained in Zhou [9], since she adopts a diﬀerent equilibrium
concept.










Note that ˜ h is orthogonal to τ. Setting τ0 = 1 and τ1 = −1, (˜ h0,˜ h1)=( 1
2, 1
2) is obtained
and the corresponding (V0,V 1) is close to optimal.












[Vn +( 1− ˜ h1)(u + Vn−1)+˜ h1Vn + kGVn],n ≥ 1.
Solving this system of equations, we obtain
V0 =
˜ h0(1 − ˜ h0 + kGt0)u − (1 − ˜ h0)(φ + ˜ h0 − kGt1)c









φ + ˜ h0
 n−1 ˜ h0 − kGt1
φ +1+kG(t0 − t1)
 




Then, since any Vn is continuous in  , all the incentive conditions are satisﬁed whenever
˜ h satisﬁes (37) and   is suﬃciently small.














































Then it is veriﬁed that  ∗ > 0 and that, for any   ∈ (0,  ∗), (h∗
0,1−h∗
0) is the distribution
in the unique SPE with N =1 .
32